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INTRODUCTION 
“I believe indeterminate sentencing can be extremely useful, but I also believe that 
 any such system should always take into consideration the special knowledge as to  
the facts in a case which only the trial judge possesses. I am deeply impressed with the gravity 
and wisdom with which most federal judges approach the responsibility of sentencing.  
It is a difficult, soul-searching task at best. – Robert F. Kennedy 
 
Robert F. Kennedy’s quote discusses the act of criminal sentencing and judicial 
discretion. He, the former United States Attorney General and the hopeful 1968 Democratic 
Presidential Nominee, believed that undetermined and unspecified criminal sentences had certain 
advantageous features, in contrast to already specified and quantified criminal sentences faced by 
federal criminal defendants. Although Robert F. Kennedy found indeterminate sentencing to be 
extremely useful, he noted the ultimate importance and significance of judicial discretion in 
determining any criminal sentence. In 1984, approximately twenty-three years after United 
States Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy delivered the above statements to the Sixth, Seventh, 
and Eighth Judicial Circuits at the Joint Sentencing Institute in Chicago, Illinois, the United 
States Congress created a new sentencing system and established the United States Sentencing 
Commission.1 In 1987, the United States Sentencing Commission, following the instructions and 
directives from the United States Congress, created a complete and comprehensively detailed set 
of sentencing guidelines that outlines a specific criminal sentencing range for any given criminal 
offense.2 
According to 18 U.S.C. §3553 (b), departures may occur only in cases when “there exists 
an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately taken into 
                                                          
1  Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Criminal Procedures: Prosecution and Adjudication, 374 (5th ed. 
2015).  
2   Id. at 374-75.  
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consideration by the [United States] Sentencing Commission in formulating the [United States 
sentencing] guidelines.”3 Yet, even with the implementation of the United States sentencing 
guidelines, which specifically outline a specific and required criminal sentencing range for any 
given criminal offense, a considerable amount of sentencing disparities and downward 
sentencing departures have occurred in many federal criminal cases, especially and most 
prevalently in cases involving federal child pornography offenses, as opposed to similarly 
situated offenses, like sexual abuse.  
This phenomenon is confirmed and illustrated by Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia Spohn, 
authors of an article and empirical study entitled Fundamentally Flawed? Exploring the Use of 
Policy Disagreements in Judicial Downward Departure for Child Pornography Sentences.4 
According to Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia Spohn, “there is little doubt that offenders in [child 
pornography] cases are regularly being sentenced below the [United States sentencing] guideline 
range.”5 Further, the authors state that this habitual practice is ultimately confirmed by a recent 
study conducted by Melissa Hamilton6 which found that “a child pornography offender was 
more likely to receive a downward departure if the sentencing judge listed a concern about the 
general adequacy of the [sentencing] guideline.”7 As noted by Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia 
Spohn, one of the purposes of their article and empirical study is to “determine whether 
sentencing judges use downward departures more frequently in child pornography cases than in 
                                                          
3  Id. at 375.  
4  See generally, Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia Spohn, Fundamentally Flawed? Exploring the Use of Policy 
Disagreements in Judicial Downward Departure for Child Pornography Sentences. 
https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/144965/content/Author_final.pdf (Last visited December 1, 2016).  
5  Id. at 11.  
6  Melissa Hamilton, Sentencing Adjudication: Lessons from Child Pornography Policy Nullification, 
Georgia State University Law Review, Volume 30, 375. 
http://readingroom.law.gsu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2746&context=gsulr (Last visited December 1, 2016). 
7  Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia Spohn, Fundamentally Flawed? Exploring the Use of Policy 
Disagreements in Judicial Downward Departure for Child Pornography Sentences, 11. 
https://repository.asu.edu/attachments/144965/content/Author_final.pdf (Last visited December 1, 2016). 
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cases involving offenders convicted of sexual abuse and other offenses,” while also attempting to 
determine “whether the magnitude of the sentence discount is larger in child pornography cases 
than in these other types of cases.”8 More simply stated, the authors maintain that their empirical 
study “assesses whether judicial downward departures are more prevalent among child 
pornography offenders compared with a matched sample of defendants convicted of other 
offenses.”9   
In order to empirically assess whether judicial downward departures are more prevalent 
among child pornography offenders in comparison to a matched sample of defendants convicted 
of other offenses, Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia Spohn compared sentencing outcomes for 
offenders convicted of sexual abuse with those for offenders convicted of child pornography 
because “both federal judges and legal scholars have specifically cited (and criticized) the 
harshness in federal sentencing for child pornography offenders compared with the more lenient 
penalties imposed on those convicted of the arguably more severe offense of sexual abuse.”10 
The authors noted that “the outcome of interest for this study is whether an offender received a 
judicial downward departure, and as a result was sentenced below the [United States sentencing] 
guideline range.”11 Ultimately, the results of Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia Spohn’s article and 
empirical study confirm that a “conviction for nonproduction child production significantly 
affects both the likelihood and the magnitude of judicial downward departure decisions.”12 
According to the authors, “[n]onproduction child pornography offenders are approximately 
[thirty-two percent] more likely than offenders convicted of sexual abuse to receive a judicial 
                                                          
8  Id. 
9  Id. at 2.  
10  Id. at 15.  
11  Id. at 17.  
12  Id. at 24.  
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downward departure, and when they do, their sentence discounts are almost [eighty-three 
percent] larger.”13  
Child pornography is “any visual depiction, including any photograph, film, video, picture, 
or computer or computer-generated image or picture, whether made or produced by electronic, 
mechanical, or other means, of sexually explicit conduct, where: the production of such visual 
depiction involves the use of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; such visual depiction 
is a digital image, computer image, or computer-generated image that is, or is indistinguishable 
from, that of a minor engaging in sexually explicit conduct; or such visual depiction has been 
created, adapted, or modified to appear that an identifiable minor is engaging in sexually explicit 
conduct.”14 A minor is defined and identified, for statutory purposes, as any individual under the 
age of eighteen.15 Research shows that a considerable number of federal judges believe that child 
pornography sentences are too long. According to Families Against Mandatory Minimums, in a 
recently conducted survey by the United States Sentencing Commission, “[seventy-one] percent 
of respondents believed that the mandatory minimum for receipt of child pornography was too 
high.”16 
Additionally, as Families Against Mandatory Minimums reports, the same holds true for 
criminal sentences stemming from the sentencing guidelines, as “[seventy] percent of judges 
surveyed respond[ed] that the [United States sentencing] guideline ranges for possession [of 
child pornography] were too high.17 Moreover, “[sixty-nine] percent [of respondents] believed 
                                                          
13  Id. 
14  Families Against Mandatory Minimums, An Introduction to Child Pornography Sentencing, 1, 
http://famm.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/09/FS-Intro-to-Child-Porn-8.22.13-fixed.pdf (Last visited December 1, 
2016). 
15  Id.  
16  Id. at 3.  
17  Id.  
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that sentences for receipt of child pornography [offenses] were excessive.”18 As a result of this 
belief, federal judges “are responding to this excess by handing down [criminal] sentences below 
the [United States sentencing] guideline range when they are able and when they believe it is 
appropriate.”19 In 2010, less than fifty-five percent of child pornography sentences fell within or 
below the United States sentencing guideline range pursuant to a government-sponsored 
departure.20 That same year, approximately forty-three percent of child pornography offenders 
received nongovernment-sponsored sentences below the appropriate United States sentencing 
guideline range.21 
According to Judge Robert W. Pratt, a United States District Judge in Des Moines, Iowa, 
“…[T]he sentencing guidelines for child pornography crimes do not appear to be based on any 
sort of science and the Court has been unable to locate any particular rationale for them beyond 
the general revulsion that is associated with child exploitation-related offenses.”22 When asked 
about sentences for child pornography offenses, Judge Jack Weinstein, a Federal District Court 
Judge for the Southern District of New York, has noted, “We’re destroying lives 
unnecessarily.”23 Further, the United States Supreme Court has stated that “departures from 
particular guideline sentences should be treated as feedback on those guidelines, information the 
[United States Sentencing] Commission can use to improve guidelines.”24 In an article entitled 
Judge Criticizes Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Pornography Case, the Denver Post 
highlighted a case where a federal judge in Denver, Colorado sentenced an individual convicted 
                                                          
18  Id.  
19  Id.  
20  Id. at 3-4 
21  Id. at 4.  
22  Id. 
23  Id.  
24  Id.  
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of a child pornography offense to the mandatory minimum of ten years in prison, while 
“criticizing the rigidity of the federal sentencing guidelines that...prevented him from giving a 
more appropriate, shorter sentence.”25 The Denver Post article noted that the federal judge issued 
a forty-page sentencing opinion, which opined that “the federally-imposed sentencing guidelines 
for child pornography possession cases are greater than necessary.”26 
Furthermore, in an article entitled Debate Rages Over Severity of Child-Porn Sentences, the 
Associated Press noted that “child-pornography offenders are now the focus of an intense debate 
within the legal community as to whether the federal sentences they face have become, in many 
cases, too severe.”27 According to the Associated Press, “many federal judges and public 
defenders say repeated moves by Congress to toughen the penalties over the past [twenty-five] 
years have badly skewed the guidelines, to the point where offenders who possess and distribute 
child pornography can go to prison for longer than those who actually rape or sexually abuse a 
child.”28 Alternatively, “some prosecutors and members of [the United States] Congress, as well 
as advocates for sexual-abuse victims, oppose a push for more leniency.”29 The Associated Press 
further notes that in a 2010 survey of federal judges conducted by the United States Sentencing 
Commission, approximately seventy percent of federal judges said that “the proposed ranges of 
sentences for possession and receipt of child pornography were too high.”30 Moreover, 
“demonstrating their displeasure, federal judges issued [child pornography] sentences below the 
                                                          
25   Kirk Mitchell, Judge Criticizes Federal Sentencing Guidelines in Pornography Case, The Denver Post 
(2016), http://www.denverpost.com/2016/07/26/judge-criticizes-federal-sentencing-guidelines-in-pornography-case/  
(Last visited December 1, 2016). 
26  Id.  
27  Debate Rages Over Severity of Child-Porn Sentences, The Associated Press (2012), 
http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/news/nation/story/2012-04-29/child-porn-sentencing/54627418/1 (Last visited 
December 1, 2016). 
28  Id. 
29  Id. 
30  Id. 
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[United States sentencing] guidelines [forty-five percent] of the time in 2010, more than double 
the rate for all other crimes.”31 
In the article, the Associated Press quotes New York-based federal defender Deirdre von 
Dornum, who notes that the “[United States] sentencing guidelines contribute to unjust 
disparities, depending on whether a prosecutor charged a defendant with receipt of child 
pornography, as well as possession.”32 According to Deirdre von Dornum, “the average sentence 
for a federal child pornography offense in 2010 was higher than for all other offenses except 
murder and kidnapping.”33 The following research essay will discuss and examine the federal 
sentencing disparities that presently exist in criminal sentencing proceedings for federal child 
pornography offenses, with a clear focus on case and statutory analysis and the historical 
progression of the United States sentencing guidelines. 
 
THE UNITED STATES SENTENCING GUIDELINES: AN OVERVIEW  
 The United States Congress created both a new sentencing system and the United States 
Sentencing Commission through the passage of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.34 In 1987, 
the United States Sentencing Commission, following general statutory guidance, produced a 
collection of comprehensive sentencing guidelines.35 Under the United States sentencing 
guidelines, the trial judge first calculates an offense level, ranging from one to forty-three, to 
measure the seriousness of the offense.36 The trial judge then calculates a criminal history 
                                                          
31  Id.  
32  Id. 
33  Id. 
34  Marc L. Miller & Ronald F. Wright, Criminal Procedures: Prosecution and Adjudication, 374 (5th ed. 
2015).  
35  Id. at 374-75. 
36  Id. at 375.  
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category, ranging on a scale from one to six, to account for the offender’s prior criminal 
convictions.37 In order for the trial judge to combine an offender’s two scores, the United States 
sentencing guidelines created a grid, placing the offense level on the vertical axis, and the 
criminal history category on the horizontal axis.38 Each combination of the two scores 
corresponds to a specific box on the grid, which contains a probable sentencing range, expressed 
as months of imprisonment, for that particular offense level and criminal history score.39  
 Each crime located within the United States sentencing guidelines begins with a base 
offense level.40 Trial judges are instructed to adjust the base offense level by either an increase or 
a decrease, depending on specific facts and offense information stemming from each respective 
case.41 Additionally, trial judges are to consider an offender’s relevant conduct related to the 
charged offense.42 Once the trial judge has determined the appropriate sentencing range through 
the use of the United States sentencing guidelines’ grid, the trial judge can also decide whether to 
“depart up or down from the narrow range of sentences specified under the guidelines.”43 As 
previously noted, according to 18 U.S.C. §3553 (b), departures may occur only in cases when 
“there exists an aggravating or mitigating circumstance of a kind, or to a degree, not adequately 
taken into consideration by the [United States] Sentencing Commission in formulating the 
[United States sentencing] guidelines.”44 
 
 
 
                                                          
37  Id.  
38  Id. 
39  Id. 
40  Id. 
41  Id. 
42  Id. 
43  Id. 
44  Id. 
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THE HISTORICAL PROGRESSION OF THE UNITED STATES  
CHILD PORNOGRAPHY SENTENCING GUIDELINES 
 
The United States Congress has immersed itself within the sentencing scheme for the 
distribution and receipt of child pornography since the passage of the Protection of Children 
Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977.45 As the distribution and receipt of child pornography 
was a primary concern for the United States Congress, the Protection of Children Against Sexual 
Exploitation Act of 1977’s focus was to ultimately prohibit the use of children to produce child 
pornography.46 The Protection of Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 established a 
ten-year statutory sentencing maximum for first-time offenders, in addition to instituting a 
fifteen-year statutory sentencing maximum for subsequent offenders.47 The Protection of 
Children Against Sexual Exploitation Act of 1977 also called for a two-year statutory sentencing 
mandatory minimum for subsequent offenders.48 Shortly thereafter, in 1984, the United States 
Congress passed the Child Protection Act of 1984, which extended penalties to individuals who 
committed distribution and receipt of child pornography offenses for non-pecuniary purposes.49 
Two years later, in 1986, the United States Congress enacted the Child Sexual Abuse and 
Pornography Act of 1982 and the Child Abuse Victims’ Rights Act of 1986.50 The latter 
provided a plethora of civil remedies for victims of child pornography offenses and ultimately 
                                                          
45  The United States Sentencing Commission, The History of the Child Pornography Guidelines, 8-9, (2009) 
http://www.ussc.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/research-and-publications/research-projects-and-surveys/sex-
offenses/20091030_History_Child_Pornography_Guidelines.pdf (Last visited December 1, 2016). 
46  Id. at 9.  
47  Id. 
48  Id. 
49  Id. 
50  Id. 
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increased the statutory sentencing mandatory minimum for subsequent offenders from two years 
to five years of imprisonment.51 
The United States Sentencing Commission issued the first set of sentencing guidelines in 
1987.52 The 1987 United States sentencing guidelines provided sentencing ranges and limits for 
offenders convicted of production of child pornography (under 18 U.S.C. §2251) and the 
transport, distribution, and receipt of child pornography (under 18 U.S.C. §2252).53 Offenders 
convicted under the aforementioned statutes were sentenced under sentencing guidelines §2G2.1 
or §2G2.2, respectively.54 It must be noted that the 1987 United States sentencing guidelines did 
not contain a sentencing range for the offense of simple possession of child pornography, as this 
offense was not a federally mandated crime in 1987.55 In order to determine the base offense 
levels for child pornography offenses, the United States Sentencing Commission examined the 
sentencing procedures of the Parole Commission.56 Then, the United States Sentencing 
Commission converted the Parole Commission’s offense categorization into a sentencing offense 
level.57 For child pornography offenses included under sentencing guideline §2G2.2, the United 
States Sentencing Commission set the base offense level at level thirteen.58 The 1987 United 
States sentencing guidelines provided a variety of additional circumstances that would subject 
certain child pornography offenders to an increase in their respective base offense level.59 For 
                                                          
51  Id. 
52  Id. at 10.  
53  Id. 
54  Id. 
55  Id. 
56  Id. 
57  Id. 
58  Id. 
59  Id. 
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example, offenders convicted under sentencing guideline §2G2.2 were subject to a two level 
increase when an image depicted a child under twelve years of age.60  
In 1988, the United States Sentencing Commission amended and expanded the language of 
sentencing guideline §2G2.2. Prior to this amendment, §2G2.2 (b)(1) stated, “If the material 
involved a minor under the age of twelve years, increase by [two] levels.”61 With the inclusion of 
the 1988 amendment, §2G2.2 (b)(1) stated, “If the material involved a prepubescent minor or a 
minor under the age of twelve years, increase by [two] levels.”62 The United States Sentencing 
Commission noted that the 1988 amendment’s purpose was “to provide an alternative measure to 
be used in determining whether the material involved an extremely young minor for cases in 
which the actual age of the minor is unknown.”63  
In 1990, the United States Sentencing Commission compiled a Staff Report on the status of 
child pornography prosecutions in the federal system.64 As noted by The History of Child 
Pornography Guidelines, the 1990 Staff Report made three findings, including that “child 
pornography had become a highly organized, multi-million-dollar industry that operates on a 
nationwide scale, but federal law enforcement efforts should not be limited to large scale 
distributors of child pornography.”65 Additionally, the 1990 Staff Report also included a 
mathematical analysis of all prosecutions of child pornography offenses sentenced under the 
1988 United States sentencing guidelines.66 The 1990 Staff Report noted that “thirty-four percent 
of child pornography offenders convicted under 18 U.S.C. §2252 received a departure from the 
                                                          
60  Id. 
61  Id. at 11. 
62  Id. at 12. 
63  Id. at 11.  
64  Id. at 13.  
65  Id. 
66  Id. 
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guidelines and the departures were almost evenly split between sentences above and below the 
guideline range.”67 Additionally, the 1990 Staff Report concluded that “the penalty structure for 
§2G2.2 was not in accord with congressional intent with respect to repeat child pornography 
trafficking offenders, who, under 18 U.S.C. §2252, were subject to a mandatory minimum term 
of five years of imprisonment.”68  
As a result of these findings, the 1990 Staff Report suggested that the base offense level for 
offenses falling within §2G2.2 be increased from level thirteen to level fifteen.69 The 1990 Staff 
Report reasoned that this base offense level increase was necessary in order to “better insure that 
the severity of the offense as indicated by the statutory penalty structure was reflected for all 
offenders under the guideline.”70 On February 16, 1990, in response to the 1990 Staff Report, the 
United States Sentencing Commission published its proposed amendments to §2G2.2 for “notice 
and comment.”71 The United States Sentencing Commission’s proposed amendments to the 
current child pornography sentencing guidelines “responded to several issues raised in the 1990 
Staff Report by retaining the base offense level of [thirteen] for offenders engaging in simple 
receipt, [and] establishing a base offense level of [fifteen] for all other offenders.”72 The United 
States Sentencing Commission’s proposed amendments also called for several additions to the 
current child pornography sentencing guidelines, including: a four level increase if the offenses 
portrayed “a sadistic or masochistic conduct or other depictions of violence”; a minimum base 
offense level of twenty-one if “the defendant sexually abused a minor at any time prior to the 
                                                          
67  Id. 
68  Id. 
69  Id. at 14.  
70  Id. 
71  Id. 
72  Id. 
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commission of the offense”; a four level increase for involvement of a minor under the age of 
twelve; and a two level increase for involvement of a minor under the age of sixteen.73  
In response to their proposed amendments, the United States Sentencing Commission 
received input and suggestions from individual judges, who explained the downward departures 
in §2G2.2 sentencings.74 The individual judges indicated that “the view that §2G2.2 offenses 
involving individuals with no significant criminal history or future likelihood of acting out 
should receive straight probationary periods.”75 On April 11, 1990, taking the individual judges’ 
commentary and suggestions into account, the United States Sentencing Commission voted to 
amend §2G2.2 to add a four level enhancement where the image portrayed “sadistic masochistic, 
or violent conduct.”76 Additionally, the United States Sentencing Commission amended the 
comment section of §2G2.2, to recommend consideration of an upward departure “where the 
defendant had sexually abused a minor at any time in the past.”77 Finally, the United States 
Sentencing Commission also amended §2G2.1 in three distinct ways: one, to create new 
enhancements related to victim age; two, to provide additional enhancements for defendants who 
abuse a position of trust; and three, to clarify sentencing guideline calculations when there are 
multiple victims.78  
On November 29, 1990, the United States Congress passed the Child Protection Restoration 
and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990, which criminalized the possession of child 
pornography.79 The Child Protection Restoration and Penalties Enhancement Act of 1990 was a 
                                                          
73  Id. at 15.  
74  Id. 
75  Id. at 16.  
76  Id. 
77  Id. 
78  Id. 
79  Id. at 17.  
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part of a much larger piece of legislation, entitled the Crime Control Act of 1990, which 
contained a general instruction to the United States Sentencing Commission to “amend existing 
guidelines for sentences involving sexual crimes against children . . . so that more substantial 
penalties may be imposed if the [United States Sentencing] Commission determines current 
penalties are inadequate.”80 On January 17, 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission 
published a proposed guideline for the offense of possession of child pornography, which sought 
to set the base offense level for the offense of possession of child pornography between level six 
and level ten.81 On May 1, 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission submitted an 
amendment entitled Amendment 372 to the United States Congress.82 Amendment 372 
“insert[ed] an additional guideline at §2G2.4 to address offenses involving receipt or possession 
of materials depicting a minor engaged in sexually explicit conduct, as distinguished from 
offenses involving trafficking in such material, which continue to be covered under §2G2.2.”83 
Moreover, the United States Sentencing Commission decided to treat the offense of receipt of 
child pornography as analogous to the offense of possession of child pornography because the 
United States Sentencing Commission determined that “receipt is a logical predicate to 
possession, [and] concluded that the guideline sentence in such cases should not turn on the 
timing or nature of law enforcement intervention, but rather on the gravity of the underlying 
conduct.”84  
On October 28, 1991, the United States Sentencing Commission was directed to increase the 
base offense levels for child pornography offenses, reorganize receipt offenses under §2G2.2, 
                                                          
80  Id. 
81  Id. at 18.  
82  Id. 
83  Id. 
84  Id. at 19.  
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and add a new specific offense characteristic for child pornography offenders.85 In response, the 
United States Sentencing Commission amended §2G2.2 by directing that receipt offenses were 
to be sentenced under §2G2.2, raising the base offense level from level thirteen to level fifteen.86 
The United States Sentencing Commission also added a five level pattern of activity 
enhancement and explanatory commentary.87 Additionally, the United States Sentencing 
Commission amended §2G2.4 by limiting the guideline to those who possess child pornography, 
raising the base offense level from level ten to level thirteen.88 The amended §2G2.4 also 
contained a specific offense characteristic regarding the number of items possessed.89  
In December 1995, the United States Congress passed the Sex Crimes Against Children 
Prevention Act of 1995, which contained specific instructions to the United States Sentencing 
Commission to increase one-hundred twenty penalties under the sentencing guidelines covering 
child pornography offenses.90 The United States Sentencing Commission was instructed to 
amend the United States sentencing guidelines to “increase the base offense level for child 
pornography offenses by at least [two] levels and to increase the base offense level by at least 
[two] levels if a computer was used to transmit the notice or advertisement to the intended 
recipient or to transport or ship the visual depiction.”91 The United States Congress also 
instructed the United States Sentencing Commission to submit a report detailing child 
pornography offenses and other sex offenses against children; the United States Sentencing 
Commission was to include in the report “an analysis of the sentences imposed for offenses [and] 
                                                          
85  Id. at 23.  
86  Id. at 24. 
87  Id. 
88  Id. 
89  Id. 
90  Id. at 26.  
91  Id. 
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an analysis of the type of substantial assistance that courts have recognized as warranting a 
downward departure from the [United States] sentencing guidelines.”92 On February 23, 1996, 
the United States Sentencing Commission published proposed amendments to §2G2.2 and 
§2G2.4 in compliance with the United States Congress’ instructions.93  
With respect to §2G2.2, the United States Sentencing Commission increased the base offense 
level for child pornography trafficking offenses from level fifteen to level seventeen and added a 
two level enhancement if a computer was used to solicit participation.94 §2G2.4 was similarly 
amended, by increasing the base offense level for possession of child pornography from thirteen 
to fifteen and added a two level enhancement for use of a computer.95 On November 1, 1996, the 
aforementioned amendments to §2G2.2 and §2G2.4 became effective.96 In June 1996, the United 
States Sentencing Commission delivered a report to Congress entitled “Sex Offenses Against 
Children: Findings and Recommendations Regarding Federal Penalties,” which analyzed 
sentences for all convictions for a child sex offense between 1994 and 1995.97 The 1996 Report 
to Congress described necessary changes to the sentencing guidelines, and explained that the 
Sentencing Commission’s analysis supported an “enhancement for use of a computer to solicit 
participation.”98 The United States Sentencing Commission noted that the prevalence of 
computer use in these crimes increased between 1994 and 1995, and stated its intention to 
“closely monitor the variety of computer uses in pornography distribution and amend the 
guidelines as appropriate.”99  
                                                          
92  Id. 
93  Id. 
94  Id. at 32. 
95  Id. 
96  Id. at 31.  
97  Id. at 29. 
98  Id. 
99  Id. 
18 
 
 In October 1998, the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998 was 
enacted, which, in addition to addressing the penalties for child pornography offenses, provided 
directives to the United States Sentencing Commission to “ensure that the sentences, guidelines, 
and policy statements for offenders convicted of child pornography offenses are appropriately 
severe and reasonably consistent with other relevant directives and with other [United States 
sentencing guidelines].”100 In addition, the Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 
1998 also instructed the United States Sentencing Commission to create amendments to “provide 
appropriate enhancement if the [offender] used a computer with the intent to persuade, induce, 
entice, coerce, or facilitate the transport of a child.”101 The United States Sentencing Commission 
was also tasked with creating amendments that would clarify that the term “distribution of 
pornography” applies to the distribution of pornography both for “monetary remuneration or for 
a nonpecuniary interest.”102 On April 4, 2000, the United States Sentencing Commission passed 
a multi-faceted amendment consistent with the instructions and specifications provided by the 
Protection of Children from Sexual Predators Act of 1998.103 The amendment “revised the 
distribution enhancement at §2G2.2 that detailed varying levels of punishment, ranging from a 
general [two] level distribution enhancement to a [seven] level enhancement for those who 
distributed child pornography for pecuniary gain or to a minor to persuade the minor to engage in 
sexual conduct.”104 
 In 2003, the United States Sentencing Commission again revised the specific United 
States sentencing guidelines covering child pornography offenses, pursuant to the Prosecutorial 
                                                          
100  Id. at 32.  
101  Id. 
102  Id. at 33.  
103  Id. at 35. 
104  Id. 
19 
 
Remedies and Other Tools to End the Exploitation of Children Today Act (hereinafter 
“PROTECT Act”).105 The PROTECT Act made several changes to the child pornography 
sentencing guidelines and contained provisions by which the United States Congress directly 
amended the United States sentencing guidelines.106 Additionally, the PROTECT Act “provided 
general directives, created a five-year mandatory minimum for trafficking and receipt, raised the 
statutory maximum for trafficking and receipt from [fifteen] to [twenty] years and for possession 
from five to ten years, and amended the prefatory language of 28 U.S.C. §994(a)(1), which 
enumerates the duties of the Commission, to require that guidelines be consistent with all 
pertinent provisions of any Federal statute.”107  
Section 401 of the PROTECT Act directly amended §2G2.2 and §2G2.4 by adding the 
following four specific offense characteristics relating to the number and type of child 
pornographic images to the text of both guidelines.108 First, if the child pornography offense 
involved at least ten images, but fewer than one-hundred fifty images, the offender’s base 
offense level was to be increased by two levels.109 Second, if the child pornography offense 
involved at least one-hundred fifty images, but fewer than three-hundred images, the offender’s 
base offense level was to be increased by three levels.110 Third, if the child pornography offense 
involved at least three-hundred images, but fewer than six-hundred images, the offender’s base 
offense level was to be increased by four levels.111 Fourth, if the child pornography offense 
involved six-hundred or more images, the offender’s base offense level was to be increased by 
                                                          
105  Id. at 38.  
106  Id. 
107  Id. 
108  Id. at 39. 
109  Id. 
110  Id. 
111  Id. 
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five levels.112 On May 16, 2003, the United States Sentencing Commission published these 
amendments and additions as a final action in the Federal Register.113  
In addition to amending the sentencing guidelines directly, the PROTECT Act also 
provided general instructions to the United States Sentencing Commission.114 For example, the 
PROTECT Act directed the United States Sentencing Commission to “review and, as 
appropriate, amend . . . to ensure that the guidelines are adequate to deter and punish 
conduct…”115 On December 30, 2003, and January 14, 2004, respectively, the United States 
Sentencing Commission published for notice and comment its proposed amendments to revise 
the child pornography guidelines in order to comply with the remaining directives of the 
PROTECT Act.116 By virtue of its notice, the United States Sentencing Commission “sought 
comment on the application of the image table, the appropriate base offense levels for the 
offenses in light of new statutory penalties, and the consolidation of §2G2.2 and §2G2.4.”117 The 
United States Sentencing Commission had considered revising the child pornography guidelines 
to consolidate §2G2.2 and §2G2.4 since at least 1996, as detailed in the 1996 Report to 
Congress; this consolidation was based on the United States Sentencing Commission’s belief that 
“receipt and possession were similar offenses,” and on concerns in “application and disparate 
resulting sentences.”118  
 The United States Sentencing Commission also focused its analysis on the application of 
the image table that was inserted directly into the United States sentencing guidelines by the 
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United States Congress.119 Through its analysis, it was discovered that the United States 
Sentencing Commission had to define the term “images,” as well as quantify video images in 
order to implement the United State Congress’ directive.120 The United States Sentencing 
Commission determined that because each video could contain multiple images, the video itself 
should be counted as more than one image.121 With the assistance of the image table enacted by 
the United States Congress, the United States Sentencing Commission “adopted a definition of 
video that considered each video to contain [seventy-five] images, squarely in the middle of the 
[two] level increase range.”122 The United States Sentencing Commission also “authorized an 
upward departure if the video was substantially longer than five minutes.”123 Additionally, 
among other changes and amendments, the United States Sentencing Commission added a two 
level decrease for offenders whose offense was limited to receipt or solicitation of child 
pornography materials; the reduction was supported by finds that “in many instances, simple 
receipt of child pornography is very similar to simple possession of child pornography, despite 
the different statutory penalties that impose a five year mandatory minimum penalty to receipt 
offenses.”124 On November 1, 2004, the guideline changes made pursuant to the PROTECT Act 
became effective.125  
 In the fall of 2008, the United States Congress, through the PROTECT Our Children Act, 
created a new offense with a statutory maximum of fifteen years, which made it unlawful to 
“knowingly produce with intent to distribute, or to knowingly distribute, child pornography that 
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is an adapted or modified depiction of an identifiable minor.”126 The United States Sentencing 
Commission selected a base offense level of eighteen for the offense, which was four levels 
lower than the base offense level for the other child pornography distribution offenses contained 
within §2G2.2.127 The United States Sentencing Commission determined that the lower base 
offense level was appropriate because “the process of creating the image does not involve the 
sexual abuse of a child and [the United States] Congress provided a lower penalty structure for 
this offense compared to other child pornography distribution offenses.”128 The United States 
Sentencing Commission also noted that the “lower base offense level also accounts for the fact 
that the enhancements…[for use of a computer]…will likely apply in these cases.”129  
 In 2012, the United States Sentencing Commission released a report to the United States 
Congress which examined cases of offenders sentenced under the United States sentencing 
guidelines for child pornography offenses.130 The primary focus of the 2012 Report to Congress 
was §2G2.2, the sentencing guideline for child pornography offenses such as possession of child 
pornography, receipt of child pornography, and distribution of child pornography.131 According 
to the United States Sentencing Commission, the purpose of the 2012 Report to Congress was to 
“contribute to the ongoing assessment by [the United States] Congress and the various 
stakeholders in the federal criminal justice system regarding how federal child pornography 
offenders are prosecuted, sentenced, incarcerated, and supervised following their reentry into the 
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community.”132 Further, the United States Sentencing Commission has noted several factors 
contributing to the issuance of the 2012 Report to Congress, including: the steadily decreasing 
rate of sentences imposed within the applicable guidelines ranges in non-production cases; and 
the existing sentencing scheme in non-production cases not adequately distinguishing among 
offenders based on their degrees of culpability as a result of recent changes in the types of 
computer and internet technologies that offenders use.133  
 In preparation for the issuance of the 2012 Report to Congress, the United States 
Sentencing Commission “reviewed both relevant statutory and case law as well as social science 
and legal literature concerning child pornography offenses, offenders, and victims; engaged in 
extensive data analyses of several thousands of federal child pornography cases from fiscal year 
1992 through the first quarter of fiscal year 2012; studied recidivism rates for child pornography 
offenders, including conducting a recidivism study of six-hundred and ten federal child 
pornography offenders sentenced under the non-production guidelines in fiscal years 1999 and 
2000; and held a public hearing at which the Commission received testimony from experts in 
technology and the social sciences, treatment providers, law enforcement officials, legal 
practitioners, victims’ advocates, and members of the judiciary.”134 As a result of their research, 
the United States Sentencing Commission discovered than an increasing number of courts and 
parties in non-production types of child pornography cases have “engaged in charging and 
sentencing practices that have had the effect of limiting the sentencing exposure for many child 
pornography offenders.”135 The United States Sentencing Commission opined that this limitation 
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on sentencing exposure for many non-production child pornography offenders is a result of the 
view that the sentencing scheme for non-production child pornography offenses is “outdated, 
fails to distinguish adequately among offenders based on their levels of culpability and 
dangerousness, and is overly severe in some cases.”136 Furthermore, the United States 
Sentencing Commission noted that growing sentencing disparities have resulted from the 
aforementioned practices.137  
 The United States Sentencing Commission’s research portrayed that approximately 
eighty percent of “non-production child pornography offenders in the fiscal year 2010 had their 
sentencing exposure reduced by one or more of the four practices employed by the parties and/or 
the courts.”138 The four practices employed by the parties and/or the courts that the United States 
Sentencing Commission considered include: charging practices; government stipulations/plea 
agreements; government sponsored variances and departures; and non-government sponsored 
variances and departures.139 The United States Sentencing Commission’s research demonstrated 
that “the median sentence for defendants whose sentencing exposure was limited was less than 
one half of the median sentence for defendants whose sentencing exposure was not limited.”140 
Additionally, the United States Sentencing Commissions discovered that certain mandatory 
minimum sentences also had a disparate effect on the length of criminal sentences imposed for 
non-production child pornography offenses.141 As noted by the United States Sentencing 
Commission, “because a mandatory minimum penalty did not apply to many of the defendants 
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whose sentencing exposure was limited, a significant percentage of such defendants received 
sentences of less than sixty months.”142 However, “relatively few defendants whose sentencing 
exposure was not limited received prison sentences below sixty months.”143  
The United States Sentencing Commission’s research indicated that “the current 
sentencing scheme in §2G2.2 places a disproportionate emphasis on outdated measures of 
culpability regarding offenders’ collecting behavior and insufficient emphases on offenders’ 
community involvement and sexual dangerousness.”144 The United States Sentencing 
Commission determined that penalty ranges for certain child pornography offenses are too severe 
for some child pornography offenders and too lenient for other child pornography offenders.145 
The United States Sentencing Commission established three categories of child pornography 
offender behavior that should be considered as primary factors in imposing sentences in §2G2.2 
cases, including: “the content of an offender’s child pornography collection and the nature of an 
offender’s collecting behavior (in terms of volume, the types of sexual conduct depicted in the 
images, the age of the victims depicted, and the extent to which an offender has organized, 
maintained, and protected his collection over time, including through the use of sophisticated 
technologies); the degree of an offender’s involvement with other offenders — in particular, in 
an Internet “community” devoted to child pornography and child sexual exploitation; and 
whether an offender has a history of engaging in sexually abusive, exploitative, or predatory 
conduct in addition to his child pornography offense.”146 As a result, the United States 
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Sentencing Commission concluded that the sentencing guidelines for offenses encompassed in 
§2G2.2 should “be revised to more fully account for these three factors and thereby provide for 
more proportionate punishments.”147 
 
UNITED STATES V. BOOKER: AN OVERVIEW 
In United States v. Booker, the Supreme Court of the United States held unconstitutional 
two provisions of the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984.148 Specifically, the two provisions of the 
Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 that were found to be unconstitutional were the provisions that 
were directly attributed to the sentencing guidelines’ mandatory nature and language.149 As a 
result of the Supreme Court of the United States’ modification, the United States sentencing 
guidelines ultimately became advisory in nature.150 As a result of the Supreme Court of the 
United States’ holding, trial courts were now required to only consider the sentencing ranges set 
forth in the United States sentencing guidelines.151 Moreover, trial courts were now permitted to 
tailor the offender’s criminal sentence in light of other statutory concerns.152  
In United States v. Booker, the defendant was charged with and found guilty of 
possession with intent to distribute at least fifty grams of cocaine.153 The statute that the 
defendant was found guilty under prescribed a minimum sentence of ten years in prison a 
maximum sentence of life.154 Solely based upon the defendant’s criminal history and the amount 
of cocaine base found by the jury, the United States sentencing guidelines required the court to 
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select a base offense level that called for a sentencing range of no less than two hundred and ten 
months to no more than two hundred and sixty-two months in prison.155 After holding a post-trial 
sentencing proceeding, the trial judge concluded by a preponderance of the evidence that the 
defendant had possessed an additional five hundred and sixty-six grams of cocaine.156 In 
addition, at that proceeding, the trial judge concluded that the defendant was also guilty of 
obstructing justice.157 The trial judge’s new findings mandated that the defendant be sentenced in 
a sentencing range between three-hundred and sixty months and life imprisonment in prison.158 
Ultimately, the defendant received a thirty-year sentence.159  
In United States v. Booker, as the Supreme Court of the United States opines, the 
defendant’s case illustrates the mandatory nature of the sentencing guidelines.160 The jury 
convicted the defendant of possessing at least fifty grams of cocaine based on evidence which 
demonstrated that he had approximately ninety-three grams of cocaine in his duffel bag.161 As 
the Supreme Court of the United States notes, under the aforementioned facts alone, the 
sentencing guidelines specified a base offense level of thirty-two, which mandated a criminal 
sentencing ranging between two-hundred and ten months and two-hundred and sixty-two 
months.162 Under the United States sentencing guidelines, had the trial judge not imposed a 
sentence range within the sentencing range for a base offense level of thirty-two, he would have 
been reversed.163  
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 According to Kathyrn A. Kimball, “the rate at which courts imposed non-government 
sponsored, below [United States sentencing guidelines] range sentences for [child pornography] 
offenses…increased after [United States v.] Booker.164 As Kathryn A. Kimball’s article entitled 
Losing Our Soul: Judicial Discretion in Sentencing Child Pornography Offenders notes, the 
percentage of downward departures for child pornography production offenses sharply rose from 
approximately two percent to approximately twelve percent after United States v. Booker.165 
Further, for child pornography distribution and trafficking offenses, the percentage of downward 
departures rose from approximately twelve percent to approximately nineteen percent following 
United States v. Booker.166 The most dramatic percentage of downward departures that Kathryn 
A. Kimball highlights is the percentage of downward departures for possession of child 
pornography offenses which rose from approximately twelve percent to approximately twenty-
six percent after the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in United States v. Booker.167 
As the aforementioned percentages demonstrate and as Kathryn A. Kimball states, “[c]learly 
[United States v.] Booker emboldened federal judges to grant downward departures more freely 
than under…the mandatory [federal sentencing guidelines’] system.168  
Moreover, according to Holly H. Krohel, the federal sentencing guidelines “decreased 
disparity and increased transparency” in criminal sentencing.169 In her article entitled Dangerous 
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Discretion: Protecting Children by Amending the Federal Child Pornography Statutes to 
Enforce Sentencing Enhancements and Prevent Noncustodial Sentences, she states, “sentencing 
disparities increased in the wake of [United States v.] Booker and its progeny, and the most 
recent data from the [United States Sentencing] Commission shows that nearly half of the 
defendants sentenced in the fiscal year 2009 received sentences outside [of] the [United States 
sentencing guidelines] range.170 Moreover, as noted by Holly H. Krohel, “the [United States 
sentencing guidelines] became advisory in order to cure the Sixth Amendment violation that 
occurred in some cases when the [United States sentencing guidelines] were mandatory.”171 
Further, “the remedial majority wanted to fix the Sixth Amendment problem while preserving 
[the United States Congress’] goal of uniformity of sentencing, but the current state of affairs 
indicates that the advisory system is not achieving that goal.”172 Holly H. Krohel notes that the 
sentencing data illustrates that many defendants who are charged with the same offenses and 
have the same criminal history are sentenced very differently; in fact, the sentencing disparities 
are even greater when it comes to child pornography offenses.173 According to Holly H. Krohel, 
the United States sentencing guidelines were necessary because “in a system claiming equal 
justice for all, disparity was an inexplicable yet constant source of embarrassment.”174 However, 
as Holly H. Krohel ultimately states, many individuals in today’s post United States v. Booker 
society wonder whether the discretionary sentencing scheme is “unintentionally jeopardizing the 
principle of equal justice under the law.”175  
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JUDICIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR DOWNWARD 
DEPARTURES IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CASES 
 
 In Rita v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States clarified that appellate 
judges could uphold sentences determined to be reasonable, regardless of whether the sentences 
fell either inside or outside the United States sentencing guidelines’ recommended range.176 
Further, in Gall v. United States, the Supreme Court of the United States held that District Court 
judges must make individualized assessments based on the facts of the case presented, and need 
not automatically assume that the guideline range is reasonable.177 According to Kimberly A. 
Kaiser and Cassia Spohn, following the Supreme Court of the United States’ decision in United 
States v. Booker, “judges were allowed to depart from the sentencing guidelines based on 
individual case circumstances.”178 Additionally, in Kimbrough v. United States, the Supreme 
Court of the United States expanded their holding in United States v. Booker, holding that 
District Court judges “could use departures not only for individualized reasons specific to an 
offender or a case, but also based on the judge’s categorical disagreement with a specific 
sentencing guideline policy.”179 Although the Supreme Court of the United States’ opinion in 
Kimbrough v. United States only specifically addressed policy disagreements with the disparate 
sentences required for offenders convicted of crack and powder cocaine offenses, “several 
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appellate courts have applied this reasoning to child pornography offenses.”180 As a result, “the 
use of downward departures in [child pornography] cases has increased.”181   
As Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia Spohn note in their article and empirical study entitled 
Fundamentally Flawed? Exploring the Use of Policy Disagreements in Judicial Downward 
Departure for Child Pornography Sentences, as a result of the aforementioned court decisions, 
federal District Court judges have been given “more latitude to depart from the [United States] 
sentencing guidelines based on individualized assessments of offenders and their crimes.”182 
Through their article and empirical study, Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia Spohn sought to 
“identify the reasons for judicial downward departure in these cases.”183 Through their research, 
the authors reviewed the reasons given by sentencing judges for the use of downward departures 
in child pornography cases in order to determine whether the use of departures in these types of 
cases represents a categorical “policy disagreement” with the United States sentencing guidelines 
for the vast group of child pornography offenses.184 Initially, the authors noted that “one of the 
primary critiques of the current child pornography sentencing scheme is that it fails to distinguish 
between variations of severity, both within child pornography offenses as well as compared with 
other offenses.”185 As such, given the “lack of adaptability within the child pornography 
sentencing structure,” the authors opined that it is possible that “judges will be more likely to use 
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downward departures to mitigate what they perceive as disproportionately severe sentences.”186 
Further, the authors hypothesized that “judges could conclude that child pornography offenders 
do not pose a danger to the community to the extent that the [United States sentencing 
guidelines] sentence would warrant.”187  
 When departing from the United States sentencing guidelines, federal sentencing judges 
are asked to provide reasons for giving a criminal sentence that deviates from the recommended 
United States sentencing guidelines sentence.188 The authors’ research indicated that the top 
three reasons given by federal sentencing judges for the use of downward departures in cases 
involving child pornography offenses were all grounds enumerated in 18 U.S.C. §3553, which 
articulates various factors to be considered during the imposition of a criminal sentence.189 The 
top three reasons given by federal sentencing judges for the use of downward departures in cases 
involving child pornography offenses include the following: the nature and circumstances of 
offense and history and character of defendant; reflect seriousness of offense, promote respect 
for law, provide just punishment for the offense, and afford adequate deterrence to criminal 
conduct.190 Unfortunately, as the authors note, the non-descriptive nature of the aforementioned 
reasons “does not provide much insight into whether [federal sentencing] judges are using these 
to express categorical disagreement with the sentencing policy or whether these are 
individualized assessments or some combination of the two.”191  
 The authors then sought to gain insight at the specific intentions of federal sentencing 
judges through the examination of reasons for downward departures that do not “neatly fit” into 
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a specific category.192 As the authors note, within the large number of possible “reason codes” 
available within the federal data, “delving into those that do not fit into this coding structure 
could provide more insight.”193 According to the authors, “[t]hese textual explanations for 
guideline departures count as “other” within the coding system offer more meaning into the exact 
reasoning the judge provided.”194 To assess the frequency at which judicial reasons do not fit 
within the traditional departure reasons, the authors counted the number of textual reasons 
offered for each offense category and calculated the rate per one-thousand cases.195 The authors’ 
empirical research indicated that the rate at which judicial explanations fit within this “other” 
option for judicial downward departures is “higher for nonproduction child pornography than for 
any other offense type.”196 The authors note that this finding “suggests that [federal sentencing] 
judges might apply more nuanced explanations when using downward departures for child 
pornography offenses.”197  
Further, the authors’ finding “is further confirmed by the substance of the text 
descriptions provided for the reasons given for below [United States sentencing guidelines] 
sentences for child pornography offenses.”198 For example, the authors’ research indicated that 
federal sentencing judges provided some of the following explanations for granting downward 
departures in federal sentences for child pornography offenders: “§2G2.2 fundamentally 
flawed”; “[j]udge categorical disagreement with §2G2.2 enhancements including computer use 
and [prepubescent] child and no [number] of images”; “[u]sage of computer enhances penalty 
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court sees this as artificial”; and “[court] views actions of [the United States Congress] regarding 
these types of cases as unreasonable.”199 Ultimately, the authors concluded that by attempting to 
circumvent what they view as flawed and overly punitive federal sentencing policies in cases 
involving child pornography offenses, “judges might be using their discretion to craft sentences 
that are more appropriate.”200 As the authors correctly note, “[t]he reasons provided by [federal 
sentencing] judges for downward departures in child pornography cases lend credence to this 
argument,”201 as “[m]any [federal sentencing] judges who departed from the presumptive 
sentence did so because of disagreement with the sentencing policies (and the resulting 
presumptive sentences) adopted for these types of cases.”202  
 
 
 
JUDICIAL EXPLANATIONS FOR DOWNWARD 
DEPARTURES IN CHILD PORNOGRAPHY CASES EXHIBITED:  
UNITED STATES V. BAIRD AND UNITED STATES V. GROBER 
 
As Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia Spohn’s findings articulate, the top three reasons 
given by federal sentencing judges for the use of downward departures in cases involving child 
pornography offenses include the following: the nature and circumstances of offense and history 
and character of defendant; reflect seriousness of offense, promote respect for law, provide just 
punishment for the offense; and afford adequate deterrence to criminal conduct.203 One case that 
supports this conclusion is United States v. Baird, where a defendant who pled guilty to 
possession of child pornography was given a twenty-four month sentence when the United States 
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sentencing guidelines recommended a sentence range of forty-six months to fifty-seven months 
based on the offender’s base offense level and criminal history score.204 In choosing to 
downwardly depart from the United States sentencing guidelines’ recommended sentence, the 
court applied the factors outlined in 18 U.S.C. §3553 to the facts of the matter at hand.205 In 
United States v. Baird, the court noted that while possession of child pornography is a serious 
offense, the seriousness of the offense as applied to the defendant in the current matter was 
“attenuated by the fact that the conduct occurred a number of years ago, and there is no evidence 
that the activity continued over any extended period of time.”206 In regards to the defendant’s 
history and characteristics, the court noted that the defendant “has no criminal history points,” “is 
intelligent and well educated,” has “served his country in Afghanistan and Iraq, receiving several 
commendations,” and has “complied with stringent conditions of pretrial release.”207 Moreover, 
the court noted and found it unlikely that the offender would “engage in this crime or any other 
criminal behavior in the future.”208 The court additionally noted that the offender has “already 
suffered serious consequences as a result of his actions.”209 Accordingly, the court found that a 
sentence of twenty-four months of incarceration “adequately addresses the sentencing objectives 
outlined in [18 U.S.C. §3553], and will impose a sentence sufficient, but not greater than 
necessary, to comply with sentencing purposes.”210  
In addition to the three traditional reasons given by federal sentencing judges for the use 
of downward departures in cases involving child pornography offenses, Kimberly A. Kaiser and 
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Cassia Spohn also identify several nontraditional textual reasons that federal sentencing judges 
have given to justify downwardly departing from the sentence recommended by the United 
States sentencing guidelines.211 As noted by Kimberly A. Kaiser and Cassia Spohn, these 
nontraditional textual reasons are a sentencing judge’s method of illustrating and articulating 
various flaws to and disagreements with the current sentencing scheme for child pornography 
offenses in order to craft a more appropriate sentence.212 One case that supports this finding is 
United States v. Grober, where a defendant who pled guilty to six child pornography counts was 
given a sixty month sentence when the United States sentencing guidelines recommended a 
sentence range of two-hundred and thirty-five months to two-hundred and ninety-three months 
based on the offender’s base offense level and criminal history score because the court was 
“clearly troubled by the sentence of imprisonment that [the United States sentencing guidelines] 
range produced.”213 The court set forth an explanation that “adequately explained why it found 
§2G2.2 flawed and why it varied from the recommended sentencing range to the ultimate 
sentence it imposed.”214 Additionally, the court noted that "§2G2.2 leads to a sentence that is too 
severe in a downloading case."215 Moreover, the court discussed several additional reasons why 
it believed §2G2.2 to be flawed, finding that “most of the enhancements are essentially inherent 
in the crime and, thus apply in nearly every case,” and that the United States sentencing 
guidelines produced “an outrageously high sentence.”216 As such, the court held that the 
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sentencing range for §2G2.2 would not be applied, as it “produces an unreasonable sentencing 
range even before considering the sentencing factors in [18 U.S.C. §3553].”217  
 
CONCLUSION 
 In conclusion, a considerable amount of sentencing disparities and downward sentencing 
departures have occurred in many federal criminal cases, especially and most prevalently in 
cases involving federal child pornography offenses, as opposed to similarly situated offenses, 
like sexual abuse. As the aforementioned case, statutory, and historical progression 
demonstrates, nationally, the sentencing disparities and downward departures in federal child 
pornography cases, and in general, have only increased since the Supreme Court of the United 
States’ holding in United States v. Booker, which essentially made the federal sentencing 
guidelines purely advisory. By making the federal sentencing guidelines purely advisory, the 
concept of judicial discretion has since regained its prominence and notoriety in federal criminal 
sentencing proceedings, using both traditional and nontraditional grounds and explanations to 
essentially sidestep the United States sentencing guidelines completely to craft sentences that any 
given federal sentencing judge deems more appropriate. While the concept of judicial discretion 
can be extremely useful, especially since the harshness of the federal sentences for child 
pornography offenders has been widely criticized, it has ultimately affected the equality and 
uniformity of criminal sentences nationally, as criminal sentences for the same offense can vary 
vastly within one courthouse or even one district, let alone separate parts of the country.  
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